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Chapter V
The Army and the Environment:
Environmental Considerations During Army
Operations
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Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not
upon those who wait to adapt themselves after they occur.
General Guilio Douhet, 19201

I

n the aftermath of the Gulf War and the subsequent U.S. military operations
in Somalia and Haiti, governments and international organizations have
renewed the debate concerning military operations and their effect on the
environment. Via CNN, Americans and the world viewed environmental damage
caused by Iraq's demolition of Kuwaiti oil wells and the deliberate release of oil
into the Gulf. In response, allied military forces conducted precision air strikes in
an effort to stop the flow into the Gulf and to extinguish oil well fires. The
consequences of these events will effect natural resources for decades.
Likewise, allied forces during Operation Desert Storm conducted the largest
land combat campaign since World War II. The mobilization, deployment, and
combat operations leading to eventual destruction of the Iraqi forces had a
significant impact on the environment. As an example, U.S. forces fired 11,000
depleted uranium rounds during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Due
to the better armor piercing capability of depleted uranium munitions, the combat
power of the U.S. military was enhanced by firing these rounds from Army and
Marine Corps tanks and U.S. Air Force attack aircraft. However, if left on the
battlefield, uranium, a radio-active heavy metal, may result in environmental
damage, as well as physiological effects to soldiers and noncombatants. 2
What is the long-term environmental impact of these events and to what extent
should military forces consider these as factors during the planning and execution
of military operations? In peacetime, environmental compliance is paramount. To
what extent will environmental considerations apply during war? How should the
Army consider these issues in its doctrine and training?
Policy makers, academia, and environmental organizations may have a
distorted sense of the environmental constraints that can realistically be placed on
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commanders during combat operations. The purpose of this paper is to examine the
extent to which environmental considerations should be a factor in Army operations
across the spectrum of conflict.
Part I of this paper examines the Army's mission, what it must be able to
accomplish to be successful on the battlefield, and the possible environmental
impacts of those actions. Part II concentrates on how environmental
considerations are examined during the Army's decision-making process. The
final portion of this paper, Part III, addresses what initiatives the Army is taking
to integrate environmental considerations into its training and doctrine.

Defining the Environment
Military doctrine defines the battlefield environment as specific features or
activities requiring further analysis, the physical space where they exist, and
how these features may influence courses of action or commanders' decisions.
For purposes of this paper, the definition of environment is broadened to
include the earth's human ecosystem, both physical and biological systems,
that provides the resources necessary to sustain productive human life: clean
air, clean water, healthy surroundings, and sufficient food.
PART I - THE ARMY AND LAND COMBAT
The United States Army exists to support and defend the Constimtion of the United
States. It does that by deterring war and, if deterrence fails, by providing Army forces
capable of achieving decisive victory as part of a joint team on the battlefield anywhere in the world and under virmally any conditions.
Field Manual 100-5
Anny Operations

Decisive Victory
The Army must be capable of decisive victory in full-dimensional operations.
This encompasses employing all means available within the laws of war to
accomplish any given mission across the full range of possible operations, both in
war and in military operations other than war (MOOTW).
To achieve victory, the Army must maintain the capability to put overwhelming
combat power on the battlefield to defeat all enemies through a total force effort.
Army forces must be of the highest quality, able to deploy rapidly, to fight, to
sustain themselves, and to win quickly with minimum casualties.
Our warfighting doctrine reflects the nature of modern warfare. It applies the
principles of war and combat power dynamics to contemporary and future
battlefields within the strategic policy direction of our government. 3

44

Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict

Application of Combat Power
Army forces in combat seek to impose their will on the enemy; in operations other
than war, they seek to alter conditions to achieve their purpose. Victory is the
objective, no matter the mission. Nothing short of victory is acceptable.
Field Manual 100-5

Anny Operations

The Army's role is to gain victory on the battlefield through the swift,
overwhelming application of maximum available combat power. Combat power is
a destructive action which must be focused to minimize collateral effects and to
promote the peace which must follow. The objectives for its employment must be
clear, achievable, and understood by leaders at all levels.
Combat power is created by combining the elements of maneuver, firepower,
protection, and leadership. Overwhelming combat power is the ability to focus
sufficient force to ensure success and deny the enemy any chance of escape or
effective retaliation. Our objective is to kill, wound, capture, or render the enemy
incapable ofinfluencing future battlefield events. Ifwe are successful, the enemy
is frozen by fear and uncertainty, confused, and isolated. Overwhelming combat
power is achieved when all combat elements are quickly brought to bear, giving
the enemy no opportunity to respond with a coordinated or effective response.
Commanders seek to apply overwhelming combat power to achieve victory at
minimal cost. They strive to convert the potential of forces, resources, and
opportunities into actual capability through violent, coordinated action at a decisive
time and place. Army commanders multiply the effects of combat power through the
integrated efforts of combat (infantry, armor, artillery, air defense, aviation), combat
support (engineers, chemical, military police), and combat service support (logistics,
medical), units as well as support provided by assisting Air Force, Marine Corps, and
Navy forces. Firepower provides destructive force. It is essential in defeating the
enemy's ability and will to fight.4

Environmental Impacts During Combat Operations
Kindhearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm
or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true
goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed; war
is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the
very worst.
Karl von Clausewitz S
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Environmental damage is an inescapable consequence of combat operations. In
ancient times, the massing of armies destroyed the harvest and turned the
battlefield to mud. In recent times, the destructive power of weaponry and
maneuver has dramatically increased the environmental impacts that result from
military operations. These impacts are magnified by the exponential expansion of
the world's population, our intensive use of natural resources, and the systemic
destruction and fragmentation of habitat world-wide by urbanization, agriculture,
mechanized land clearing, and transportation systems. Consequently, th~
environmental effects of war are more devastating and proportionally greater than
at any time in history.
As Clausewitz warned, there is no way that war can be made "nice." When a
nation strives to make war "nice," or accepts limitations on the use offorce beyond
those required by the law of war, it does so at its own peril. A less-moral nation
will take advantage of its opponent's constraint, often to the detriment of the
civilian population in the battle zone, as well as the army fighting with restraint.
The Vietnam War is a painful example of this mistaken thinking. 6
For example, during the 1968 Battle of Hue in Vietnam, Marines were tasked
with a three-fold mission: destroy as many of the enemy as possible, minimize
casualties, and minimize collateral damage to the historical city. Formerly the
imperial capital of united Vietnam and the center of Vietnamese cultural and
religious life, Hue became an important symbol in the struggle for dominance of
Indochina. Marines were instructed not to use heavy weapons in order to preserve
the ancient city. The enemy capitalized on America's restraint by forcing the
Marines into a bloody, house-by-house battle. As the number offriendly casualties
increased to a devastating level, the weapons restriction was lifted and the city was
secured. 7

Impacts on the Environment
Actions that inflict environmental impacts during the conduct of war can be
divided into three broad categories:
• Collateral damage
• Wanton, unnecessary impact
• Modification of the environment
Collateral damage results from military actions to achieve strategic, operational, or
tactical objectives during armed conflict. The ultimate objective of each
commander is to achieve victory over the enemy at minimal cost to friendly forces
through the application of overwhelming combat power.
Two of the principal components of combat power are maneuver and firepower.
Each exacts a toll on the environment and the impacts of protracted warfare on
the environment are inherently destructive. Off-road maneuvering of armored,
tracked vehicles such as tanks, personnel carriers, and self-propelled artillery can
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inflict extensive damage on sensitive ecosystems. Concentrating firepower on
enemy targets can decimate habitat. The destruction of enemy targets such as fuel
storage areas and munitions stockpiles results in the release of hazardous
substances and pollutants into the environment, contaminating the land, the
water, and the air. Unintended collateral damage to other facilities, such as waste
water treatment plants, also can result in additional pollution.
The principles of war are the enduring bedrock of Army doctrine. Their
application enables the Army to achieve quick and decisive victory.
Environmental considerations should not obstruct the application of the
principles of war during armed conflict. Environmental restraints should not
increase the cost of victory to friendly forces, the probability of a prolonged
conflict, or the probability of an unfavorable outcome. Take, for example, the
principles of maneuver and surprise. By maneuver we place the enemy in a position
of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Maneuver is
dynamic warfare that rejects predictable patterns of operations. By surprise we
strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared.
Commanders combine variations of tactics and methods of operation as well as
deception to surprise the enemy with the unexpected application of combat power.
Victory requires that Army commanders have maximum flexibility to
maneuver against and surprise the enemy. Restricting military operations to avoid
ecologically sensitive habitat, or imposing a no-fire zone because of a target's
potential to pollute, could provide the enemy with the ability to predict our actions.
This allows him to protect his forces from attack and prolong the war.
During combat operations, emphasis must be placed on mission
accomplishment. The goal of minimizing environmental impacts is best achieved
by applying the principles of war to achieve quick, decisive victory. Unavoidable
environmental impacts necessary and proportional to such a response must be
allowed. Restricting the application of combat power to predictable patterns of
behavior based on environmental considerations must be avoided.
Wanton, unnecessary impact consists ofactions that inflict environmental damage
that cannot be justified by military necessity. This is the type of damage most
recently associated with Iraq's actions in the course of the Persian Gulf War.
During its occupation of Kuwait, Iraq set Kuwaiti oil fields ablaze and fouled the
waters of the Persian Gulf by releasing millions of barrels of crude oil into the
environment. These activities violate Article 55 of Hague Convention IV, which
requires belligerents to safeguard the real property of hostile States and to
administer such property in accordance with the rules of conflict.8 Additionally,
Article 51 of the Fourth Geneva Convention9 forbids any destruction of real
property unless it is absolutely necessary for the conduct of military operations.
The United States and military services condemn such conduct, which is excessive,
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unnecessary, and only peripherally related to achieving strategic and tactical
military objectives.
Modifications to the environment consists of actions that are environmental
modification techniques which cause widespread ("encompassing an area on the
scale of several hundred square kilometers"), long-lasting ("lasting for a period of
months, or approximately a season"), or severe damage ("involving serious or
significant disruption or harm to human life, natural or economic resources, or
other assets") intended to gain a tactical advantage. These actions are addressed
by the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention. 10

Disciplined Operations
War is tough, uncompromising, and unforgiving. The Army operates with
applicable rules of engagement (ROE), conducting warfare in compliance with
intemationallaws and within the conditions specified by the commander. The ROE
specify the circumstances under which forces may engage the enemy. The Army
applies the necessary combat power to ensure victory through appropriate and
disciplined use offorce.
Exercising discipline during operations includes limiting collateral damage
which is the inadvertent or unavoidable damage occurring as a result of actions by
friendly or enemy forces. Discipline begins with trained leaders whose personal
example, standard of conduct, concern for soldiers, and loyalty to subordinates
creates well-disciplined units and proper conduct of battlefield operations. Army
Field Manual 27-10, The Law ofLand Waifare, provides guidance to commanders
on international law and the Geneva and Hague Conventions. It also governs
appropriate soldier conduct in warY Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations,
provides guidance on control and treatment of displaced civilians. 12
A nation that disregards the human rights of individuals makes warfare
unnecessarily harsh, increases the resolve of its enemy, and changes the nature of
the conflict. How the Army fights is a mark of what it is and the principles for
which it stands. Laws ofwar are only effective in reducing casualties and enhancing
fair treatment of combatants and noncombatants as long as trained leaders ensure
those laws are obeyed. The commander ensures the proper treatment of prisoners,
noncombatants, and civilians by implementing training programs that reinforce
the practice of respecting those laws and ROE. 13
Law of war training, conducted in Army service schools and reinforced by unit
commanders, emphasizes the military and political reasons for respect for the law:
• Discipline in combat is essential.
• Violations of the law of war detract from a commander's accomplishment of
his mission.
• Violations of the law of war frequently lead to a loss of public support.
• Violations of the law of war may arouse an enemy to greater resistance.
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Both in training and in combat, the Army strives to use sound environmental
practices. Many of these are also wise tactical, medical, and operational security
practices. For example, safe fuel handling, preventive vehicle maintenance, and proper
disposal ofsolidlhazardous waste are sound environmental and tactical considerations
that carry over from training into combat and operations other than war.
In some respects, protecting the natural environment may seem to run counter
to the warrior culture and may even be regarded as an impediment to battlefield
success. The realities of the 21st Century, however, require the incorporation of
an environmental ethic into how the Army plans its battles. Military commanders
have an obligation to avoid unnecessary damage to the environment whenever
possible.
Environmental dilemmas faced by a commander during combat must be
weighed with other considerations such as desired end-state and force protection.
The warfighting staff considers these potential impacts during the decision
making process. Part II of this paper explains how environmental considerations
fit into the planning process.

PART II - ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE
DECISION MAKING PROCESS
Army Decision Making Model
Before additional environmental limitations are placed on commanders, it is
important to understand how environmental considerations fit into the Army's
decision-making process.
The Army has traditionally viewed military decision-making as both science
and art. Many aspects of combat operations, such as movement rates, fuel
consumption, and weapons effects, are quantifiable. Such aspects make up the
"science" of war. However, the Army cannot quantify facets like the impact of
leadership, the complexity of modern operations, and the uncertainty regarding
enemy intentions.
A commander continually faces situations involving uncertainties,
questionable or incomplete data, and several possible alternatives. As the primary
decision maker, the commander, with the assistance of the battle staff, must not
only decide what to do and how to do it, but must also recognize if and when a
decision must be made.
The Army teaches commanders and staff to use a systematic approach to
decision-making. It fosters effective analysis by enhancing the application of
professional knowledge, logic, and judgment. 14 These steps guide the staff to:
1. Recognize and define problems.
2. Gather facts and make assumptions to determine the scope of, and the
solution to problems.
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3. Develop possible solutions.
4. Analyze each solution.
5. Compare the outcome of each solution.
6. Elect the best solution.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
To gather information for the first two steps of the decision-making process,
the staff conducts the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). This review
is a continuous process of analyzing the threat and area·of operations, in a specific
geographic area. It is designed to support the decision-making process.
During the IPB process, the staffidentifies significant characteristics of the area
for future analysis. These specific features may influence available courses ofaction
or the commander's decision. For example, during humanitarian assistance
operations, the activities of civilian relief organizations might be a significant
characteristic of the battlefield. Similarly, during support to counter-drug
operations, significant characteristics might include the production of narcotics
or the trading of weapons. For both combat operations and MOOTW, it is during
this phase of the IPB process when environmental considerations are developed. lS
To better understand how environmental considerations are integrated into the
planning process, consider this scenario. During war, an armor commander is
given a mission to destroy an enemy force and seize their defensive location which
is in a key position along the allied axis of advance. After receiving the mission,
the commander's staff will conduct a mission analysis of the operation. As said
earlier, the foundation for this mission analysis is the information gatheringphase,
the IPB process.
As the staff compiles information about the mission, it discovers that the
enemy's position is near a fuel storage facility. The facility is directly above an
isolated water shed w.hich supplies water to a significant portion of the local
population. They realize that the water shed may be contaminated if the fuel
storage tanks are ruptured. The staff notes this dilemma and continues to
formulate a plan. They then prepare multiple courses of action to allow the
commander to weigh the many options for the mission.
When all the additional courses of action are developed, the staff briefs the
commander on the different ways his force could proceed with the attack. As a part
of this briefing, the staff will address the facts and assumptions that were
considered in formulating the various options. In this scenario, the stafflisted as
a fact that the water shed is directly below the enemy's position. As an assumption,
they indicate that if the position is attacked, the tanks will be ruptured and the
water shed will be contaminated.
The significance of the enemy location near the fuel storage area may prevent
the armor force from simply attacking the position. The commander examines
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each course of action and weighs the significance of each one in terms of elements
key to success, similar to the principles of war discussed in Part I. Based on the
evaluation of each plan, the commander selects an option and directs the staff to
develop the operational plan.
Due to other operational constraints, the commander may elect to attack the
position, thereby causing environmental damage. Just as likely, if other viable
options exist, the commander may choose another course of action and protect the
local population's water supply.

Staff Organization and Operation
The Army has historically integrated other factors, such as protection of
noncombatants and historica1lcultural sites, during the planning process. Many ofthe
division and brigade staffelements have some environmental planning and oversight
responsibilities. These responsibilities are identified in Field Manua1!01-5, Staff
Organizations and Operations. 16 Take for example the protection of culturallhistorica1
sites and artifacts. The staff elements responsibilities include the following:
• Civil Affairs Officer (G5/S5) - Together with the Intelligence Officer,
determines the location of archives, monuments, and art objects of value to the
U.S., allies, or civil government. As appropriate, recommends to the Operations
Officer those items which, because of political, cultural, or economic value, justify
use of combat elements for their seizure and security. As appropriate, recommends
to the commander the disposition of each item.
• Intelligence Officer (G2/S2) - Coordinates with the Civil Affairs Officer in
locating and searching archives. May provide archives team for intelligence search.
Returns archives after intelligence processing and recommends the safeguarding
of archives.
• Operations Officer (G3/S3) - Prepares recommendation for adjusting tactical
plans to prevent destruction of arts, monuments, and archives. Assigns special
missions to tactical units to secure and safeguard such objects.
• Personnel Officer (Gl/S!) - Coordinates with the Public Affairs Officer
appropriate instructions for military personnel concerning treatment of arts,
monuments, and archives.
• Provost Marshal (PM) - Coordinates with host-nation military and civilian
police in concert with the Civil Affairs Officer.
• Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD) - Receives locations of the artifacts
and sites from the Operations Officer to prevent destruction by fire support, such
as artillery.
• Public Affairs Officer (PAO) - With the Civil Affairs Officer and the
Personnel Officer, uses command information channels to release information on
appropriate treatment of arts, monuments, and archives.
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• StaffJudge Advocate (SJA) - Provides legal advice to ensure compliance with
the law of armed conflict.
A similar process would be taken for natural resources. After reviewing the
staffs actions for cultural!historical sites and artifacts, consider again the previous
example of an enemy's position near a fuel storage facility. The staff works to
quickly determine if the tactical value of the mission out-weighs other
environmental factors, such as the contamination of the local water supply. The
staff considers many factors including the law of war, the commander's intent, and
the rules of engagement. They present their recommendation to the commander
for consideration. Regardless of the type of consideration-whether a tactical
factor, such as ammunition availability, or an environmental factor-the process
is still the same.
This may require technical assistance from other members of the staff to fully
review and integrate any environmental considerations. The Staff Engineer is the
commander's terrain expert. He can identify problem areas and predict potential
impact. Similarly, the Division Surgeon is the medical advisor to the staff and can
identify the potential health impacts of any proposed action. The G-S or civil affairs
section can assist the SJA in determining the impact on non-combatants. Since most
of the environmental considerations will be raised during the IPB process, the
commander's Intelligence Officer can also help the staff in bringing all the pieces
together and weighing their significance. The Intelligence Officer can also predict
possible actions the enemy may take to use the environment to his tactical advantage.
Doctrinal integration of environmental considerations is a significant focus of
the Army's environmental strategy. The Army is taking proactive steps, both in
doctrine and training, to prepare our soldiers and leaders for the increasing
environmental challenges of Army operations.
PART III -INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS INTO
DOCTRINE AND TRAINING

Full
integration
will
occur
when
everyone-leaders,
soldiers,
families-automatically includes environmental impact considerations in the
planning and execution of activities... Training and doctrine are the key. We have
instilled the warfighting ethic throughout the force, and we are now instilling an
environmental ethic as well... We are incorporating environmental considerations in
our doctrine...in our training... in our decision-making process.
General Gordon R. Sullivan, U.S. Ann/7

Commander's Intent
The U.S. Army Environmental Strategy into the 21st Century, the Army's
concept for environmental excellence, was signed by the Secretary and the Chief
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of Staff of the Army in November 1992.18 The strategy stated, "Leadership is the
key to success. Each of you in the chain of command is responsible for ensuring
that the U.S. Army's environmental strategy is implemented and that
environmental stewardship is an integral part of everything you do."
The strategy provides policy and objectives in the various areas of
environmental stewardship as well as a vision for the future. It also identifies four
critical elements pertinent to doctrine and training:
• Commit the chain of command.
• Organize for success.
• Spread the environmental ethic.
• Train and educate the force.

Commit the Chain of Command
Guidance from the senior leadership is clear and sufficient. The Secretary of
the Army and Chiefof Staff have committed the chain ofcommand to this mission.
A parallel can be drawn between the Army's effort to integrate environmental
considerations with the proven initiatives of the Army's safety program. The
success of the safety program, as with the environmental program, hinges on
commitment of the chain of command. Safety briefings cannot solve the Army's
safety problems. The number of safety-related incidents decreased when safety
became a commander's program and was integrated into the way we do business.
Likewise, to decrease the impacts of Army operations on the environment, we
must integrate environmental considerations into our everyday operations.
Organize for Success
In 1993, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) designated
the U.S. Army Engineer School as the executive agent for the development and
integration of environmental doctrine and training as they apply to tactical units
and the Army in the field. Their action plan was created with the assistance of
Department of the Army-level environmental staff and the other Army service
schools and is delineated in five steps: 19
• Establish procedures for incorporating environmental protection and
enhancement into Army doctrine.
• Determine requirements for environmental training programs.
• Determine procedures for conducting individual and collective
environmental task analysis.
• Determine resources needed to implement the plan.
• Establish milestones.
We must now take the action plan and determine the what, where, when, and
how soldiers will be trained:
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What (doctrine and specific tasks).
Where (resident, non-resident, unit sustainment).
When (level of military education).
How (type ofinstruction).

Spread the Environmental Ethic
Field Manual 22-100, Military Leadership,20 defmes ethics as "principles or
standards that guide professionals to do the moral or right thing which should be
done."
Stewardship is a key element of the Army's environmental ethic. Our Army is
charged with protecting and defending the nation, to include safeguarding the
environment. In addition, the Army has been entrusted with 12 million acres and
many cultural and natural resources. The American people expect the Army to
exercise good judgment in the use and management ofthose resources. They expect
the Army to be a good steward of the assets entrusted to it.

Train and Educate the Force-Doctrinal Integration
Environmental issues play an ever-increasing role on the battlefield, and they
are becoming even more significant in conducting military operations other than
war. Army units now face an incredible mix of operational requirements. Recent
deployments have placed small units and junior leaders in critical situations where
there are few rules and personal judgment is the best guide. For these reasons, the
Army must provide environmental guidance in every level of doctrine.
Army operational doctrine is comprehensive. It integrates hundreds of subjects
into a tightly crafted collection of writings that provide guidance to soldiers at
every level. Mapping the requirements of the Army's environmental strategy into
operational doctrine will entail a gradual process of introducing concepts and
norms into capstone doctrinal manuals while simultaneously developing specific
requirements in procedural publications.
To be fully integrated into Army planning, training, and operations, the
appropriate level of environmental considerations must be incorporated into
capstone field manuals. The following capstone manuals will drive subordinate
doctrine, provide the impetus for training and professional education, and begin
the long-term process of preparing for the environmental requirements of the 21st
century:
• FM 100-S,Army Operations. 21 This capstone operational doctrine underpins
all of the Army's doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel,
and soldier concerns. Environmental values and considerations should be
included in the view of war, the strategic context, the training and readiness
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challenge, military operations other than war, and the physical dimension of
combat.
• FM 100-1, The Anny.22 The definition of the Army environmental ethic and
environmental considerations belong in this source book for strategic doctrine.
• FM 22-100, Military Leadership.23 This manual should discuss the
environmental component of ethiCal leadership.
• FM 25-100, Training the Forci4 and FM 25-101, Battle Focus Training. 25 The
Army's training function is directly affected by environmental factors. The
training management cycle should include segments on land and endangered
species management, range restrictions, training area carrying capacity, and noise.
• FM 100-10, Combat Service Support. 26 Supply, maintenance, and field
service-support activities generate large quantities ofwaste. Petroleum storage and
distribution systems are particularly prone to causing environmental problems.
Logistical planning includes many environmental considerations such as health
service support and waste disposal.
• FM 101-5, Staff Organizations and OperationsP Many of the staff elements
have some environmental planning and oversight responsibility. These positions
must be identified and their environmental functions integrated throughout the
entire staff. This manual also outlines the Army's decision-making process.
• FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation ofthe Battlefield.28 As explained in Part II
of this paper, the IPB process needs to specifically include the investigation of
environmental considerations.

Train and Educate the Force-Environmental Training
"Integration" is the philosophy used in designing environmental training
programs. Rather than developing stand-alone courses, the Army integrates
environmental considerations into all levels of existing training.

Individual and Collective Tasks
The Army is striving to integrate environmental considerations into military
occupational skills (MOS) training. Integration is more urgent for some skills than
others. For example, fuel handlers, heavy equipment operators, mechanics, and
heavy weapons handlers require immediate attention. To meet this need, the Army
established an environmental work group composed of members from its service
schools. The work group representatives ensure environmental training is
incorporated into their school's training programs and doctrinal manuals. 29
The integration efforts of the Combined Arms Support Command (CAS COM),
a member of the TRADOC Environmental Work Group, are a major success story.
CASCOM is responsible for the service support branches, including
Quartermaster, Ordnance, Transportation, and Missile/Munitions Schools.
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CASCOM recently released the Soldier Training Plan (STP) for MOS 77F, Fuel
Handler. The potential environmental impacts from fuel handlers are obvious and
CASCOM considered this when defining the tasks, conditions, and standards. Their
new manual is an excellent example of how environmental considerations can be
incorporated into operations without sacrificing mission accomplishment.30

Resident Training:
To further support environmental education, the Army directed its service
schools to include environmental instruction in their resident training programs.
These resident courses range from initial entry (basic training) through the
Sergeants Major Academy, and from officer precommissioning to pre command
courses.31
The environmental instruction contains the baseline environmental
knowledge that all soldiers of that rank will receive. The students must identify
the Army and unit environmental programs, identify applicable environmental
laws and Army regulations, describe soldier and leader duties, and develop the
environmental ethic.
SUMMATION

The Army must be capable of decisive victory in full-dimensional operations.
This encompasses employing all means available within the laws of war to
accomplish any given mission, across the full range of possible operations, both
in war and in military operations other than war.
The acceptable level of these impacts is not finite and will vary based on the
intensity of the conflict. The Army applies the combat power necessary to ensure
victory through an appropriate and disciplined use of force. The Army conducts
warfare in accordance with international treaties, the rules of engagement, and
guidance from commanders.
To minimize the collateral damage, the warfighting staff evaluates
environmental considerations early in the decision-making process. The
commander has the challenging task of weighing environmental considerations
with other operational concerns.
The Army is integrating environmental considerations into training and
doctrine. This begins by establishing an environmental ethic and an
understanding ofthe laws of war.
A sound environmental ethic and specific doctrinal guidance will prepare our
soldiers and leaders for operations in the 21st Century and the challenges it
presents.
The Army faces a unique set of challenges as it adapts to a world that has
changed more broadly and fundamentally than at any time since the end ofWWII.
The Army must continue to adapt to ensure success in a rapidly changing strategic
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environment. Now, more than ever before, it serves as a strategic Army, a land
force on which the United States and its allies rely to meet global challenges.32
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